society; it impedes good government and administrative practice. In 2008 the World Economic Forum (2008) estimated that corruption accounts for about 5 per cent of global GDP (about US $2.6 trillion) and furthermore it is estimated that every year around $1 trillion is paid in bribes and $40 billion is looted by corrupt political leaders Corruption poses threats to principles of democracy, justice and the economy. It aff ects all countries regardless of their level of development. Nevertheless, some countries experience corruption more than others, and of course some places have more corruption than others. There is a widespread but still non-random distribution of corruption in societies, and thus a challenging fi eld of study for scholars from various disciplines with the ongoing arguments about a uniform defi nition and measurement of corruption and, importantly, the limited eff ect of scholarly work in this area.
The academic literature on corruption is often focused on big picture examples of corruption: studies of whole regimes and studies of nation states (Larmour & Barcham, 2006; Chang & Chu, 2008; Transparency International, 2009a) , studies of economic development on a grand scale (Stapenhurst & Kpundeh, 1999; Levy & Kpundeh, 2004) , and studies of the rule of law (Licht et al., 2007; Uslaner, 2008) . There are global league tables of corruption (Transparency International, 2009b) ; there are indexes of bribe paying (Transparency International, 2008a) ; there are studies of corruption in whole sectors such as in water (Transparency International, 2008b) , health (Transparency International, 2006) , climate change (Transparency International, 2010) . There are studies of situations such as the context and operations of corrupt subsidy frauds (Passas & Nelken, 1993) ; there are studies of victims of corrupt behaviour (Hunt, 2007) whether they be food aid recipients (Deshingkar et al., 2005; Radelet, 2006) , victims of shoddy construction (Green, 2005) , or banking victims (Passas, 1996 and 1997) .
There is a very diverse literature on corruption and a great deal of this is bound within disciplinary categories. In the political science literature Heidenheimer and Johnston (2008) have edited a thousand-page volume that covers defi nitions and perceptions, modernization and development, political processes and comparisons across time and place, as well as specifi c studies of activities in Africa and Asia, studies in authoritarian regimes and liberal democracies, and also processes in political parties and political campaigns. The themes here focus on distortions of process and the corrupt manipulation of systems structured for the benefi t of many that are hijacked for the advantage of the few. Studies of political corruption help us understand the institutions and processes that allocate power and achieve or distort the attainment of well-intentioned and articulated political goals. Johnston (2005) takes the analysis further in his book Syndromes of Corruption where he documents, with strong data, how groups exchange wealth and power and do so in the shadow of the strengths and weaknesses of the state. By identifying 'infl uence markets', 'elite cartels', 'oligarchs and clans' and 'offi cial moguls' he shows how reform can be applied, building on the evidence of operations of these syndromes in diff erent political environments
From the seminal work of Susan Rose-Ackerman (1975) on the economics of corruption to more recent comprehensive analyses of corruption, economists have examined corruption in virtually every aspect of macroeconomic and microeconomic behaviour and in the allocation, distribution and delivery of goods and services. Aidt (2003) , for example, covers issues such as incentives, rents, welfare eff ects, institutional capacity and self-reinforcing corruption, while Khan and Sundaram (2000) have a focus on the specifi cs of corruption in economic development. The World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/) has focused on development issues and has a massive literature on corruption measurement and control (Kaufman et al., 2006) and governance options (Kaufman, 2005) . The World Bank Institute (www.worldbank.org/wbi), a research unit within the World Bank, currently undertakes economic analyses of seven topics: climate change; growth and crisis; governance; fragile and confl ict-aff ected states; health systems; public-private partnerships; and urban studies. Rose-Ackerman (1999) weaves many threads together by examining the economic impact of corruption and how high level offi cials manipulate political power and civil service processes, especially in the development context.
Historians have documented ancient and recent manifestations of the phenomenon. Anthropologists have studied gifts, bribes and patronage in diff erent cultures, while lawyers have written extensively on the rule of law and the jurisprudence surrounding corruption. International agencies such as the United Nations, the World Bank, Transparency International and a host of NGOs have made extensive studies of corruption and gone the extra step to propose positive responses to its control. However, many of these reports focus on whole countries or are at a very high level of abstraction.
Specifi c works such as Quah's (2003) Controlling Corruption in Asia, and Larmour and Wolanin's (2001) Corruption and Anti-Corruption propose practical institutional responses. Passas (1998) has written about how transnational organized crime has fuelled corruption and how illegal markets have been manipulated by criminal operators, thus weakening social control. Numerous specifi c studies focus on preventing and controlling economic crime (Grabosky, 2001) , money laundering (Levi et al., 2007) , and building organizational integrity (Boardman & Klum, 2001 ). Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996) issue a note of caution and argue that the pursuit of absolute integrity, the proliferation of mechanisms to root out corruption, can sometimes be counter-productive and make it much more diffi cult to govern.
To begin with, nearly everyone has views about what activities and behaviours are corrupt; -but in many respects corruption is like an elephant -it's easier to identify than it is to describe! Defi nitions abound -most commonly the Transparency International (2010) defi nition 'the abuse of entrusted power for private gain'. Also useful is Robert Klitgaard's (1991) formula C = M+D-A (corruption equals monopoly plus discretion minus accountability). This provides a basis for shaping culture and work activities.
The measurement of corruption has always been problematic due to several reasons such as the hidden nature of corruption, the lack of consensus on the defi nition of corruption and, last but not least, the multifaceted nature of corruption. Still in general, activities that involve bribery and graft, extortion, kickbacks, misappropriation theft and fraud by virtue of one's position, self-dealing, patronage, abuse of discretion, creating or exploiting confl ict of interest, nepotism, clientelism and favouritism, as well as political manipulation are all generally agreed to constitute corrupt behaviour. These various corrupt behaviours occur in diff erent activities and diff erent sectors of all societies. Most commonly these apply in:
• buying things (procurement processes, issuing contracts etc.);
• appointing personnel;
• delivering programmes or services;
• making things (road construction, major capital works, housing developments etc.); • controlling activities (licensing/regulation/issuing of permits etc.); and • many forms of administration (justice mostly, but also health, environmental services, etc.).
As can be understood from this classifi cation every sector that delivers services to the public is vulnerable, and diff erent societies may be expected to have vastly diff erent experiences. And again this is the case in both rich countries and poor countries. Despite this fact a great deal of the literature on corruption focuses on poor countries and sets admirable strategies that develop means and methods for:
• criminalization, investigation, prosecution, sanctions;
• the workings of anti-corruption agencies; Rich countries generally have these controls in place and yet there are still many examples of petty and serious corruption (minor incidents, scandals, and state capture) even where there is legislation and enforcement, structural integrity and a vigilant press. Implementation of these uniform strategies does not always yield successful results as corruption can take many forms with regard to its nature, focus, and scope. Therefore as McCusker (2006) states, with our background of inoperative and/or disintegrated controls, every anti-corruption strategy should focus on the sophisticated relationship between the initiators, participants and targets of the corrupt act. Analysis of corruption, and strategies to prevent and or control corruption activities can take place on a sector-by-sector basis. We can study economic institutions and global trade; we could examine international confl ict and the trade in weapons. We know that justice systems that unfairly deny the rule of law have severe consequences as well as international implications. Much the same can be said of corruption in agriculture, energy and resources and environmental and climate change matters. The nation state used to be the main unit for analysis, but this is clearly no longer the case. Corruption has global impacts, and while much legislation is limited by national borders, nefarious activities cross borders with impunity, and law enforcement is often severely constrained by jurisdictional limits.
Through rigorous analysis and theoretical foundations, this book provides a multi-disciplinary and international account of corruption and its control from the perspectives of public policy, criminal law and criminology, as well as considering principles of prevention and control of corruption in both the public and private sectors across the globe. We include research and analysis from countries representing all continents, thus providing a unique opportunity to examine how legal and policy responses have been created to deal with the problems of corruption that arise not only in new and developing economies, but also in Western democratic regions that, despite their best eff orts, continue to fall prey to corrupt practice in government and business.
This book has a tri-partite structure that begins with a review of corruption in its historical perspective and a comparative analysis of research into corruption which has developed, globally over time, particularly since 1990 when there has been increased awareness of the relevance of corruption to economic and social development. Consideration is then given to the global dynamics of corruption control and the work conducted at the World Bank in which the design and implementation of governance and anti-corruption reforms are based on micro-data and greater ownership of the diagnostic process by individual countries.
Part II explores corruption as it occurs in practice in varying sectors, markets and jurisdictions. In relation to public sector activities, the risks of corruption that arise in government procurement are presented and solutions given for minimizing such risks, especially for the largest economies. A case study is then presented of how the sanctions against Iraq in the Oil For Food programme were circumvented. There are lessons for governments in how to avoid procurement-related corruption in global aid programmes.
Turning to the major environmental challenges facing the 21st century, evidence is presented of how corruption has arisen in connection with major environmental change programmes globally. Some of the governance challenges within climate fi nance fl ows are considered and suggestions made for overcoming such challenges through enhanced safeguards and measures to ensure better transparency, accountability and integrity. One environmental approach, Reducing Carbon Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+), is examined and consideration given to the more general risks of corruption that have arisen in connection with the forestry industry.
In relation to the business world, we examine the relationship between corruption and fi nancial crime and, in particular, how fraud and fi nancial crime are facilitated by corrupt practices, including opportunities for corruption created by the global fi nancial crisis and government stimulus payments. The ways in which corruption can be facilitated through the use of international fi nancial transactions is explored in a chapter which examines the presence of corrupt practices involving off shore fi nancial centres. A specifi c case study is also provided of corruption in the global diamond trade and another chapter reviews the many corrupt practices that have arisen in connection with the global trade in art and antiquities. Part II concludes with an analysis of how information and communications technologies have not only facilitated conventional corrupt practices, but created new opportunities for corruption within the information technology industry itself.
Part III explores the avenues that exist for corruption to be prevented and controlled and provides illustrations of some of the more successful developments in a variety of countries. It begins by exploring how preventive measures can best be monitored and evaluated, and how monitoring progress in the fi ght against corruption takes place in multi-project, multistakeholder organizations. It then describes the international normative approaches that have been taken to the control of corruption, especially the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and then examines some of the specifi c legislative responses that countries have used to prevent corrupt conduct and, more particularly, to follow the fi nancial proceeds of corrupt conduct. An example is provided of how one anticorruption measure, the OECD's Convention against Bribery, has been implemented in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia.
Consideration is also given to how the global anti-money laundering regime and the laws that enable the confi scation of the proceeds of crime and criminally-derived assets can be used in the fi ght against global corruption. One particular issue that is explored concerns the question of whether an activist regulatory stance can overcome legislative problems in preventive anti-corruption agencies such as those present in Montenegro. A case study of one of the world's fi rst, and most successful anti-corruption agencies is then presented with an examination of Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption, and how this has evolved over time.
Part III then turns to an analysis of how cultures of integrity can be promoted within both the public and private sectors, and also how educational measures can be used to minimize risks of corruption occurring. Of course, it is apparent that raising awareness of corruption requires systems and procedures to be created that enable individuals who become aware of illegality to report it in the public interest. We examine a number of innovative approaches to whistleblowing in Australia, in this regard. Finally, we end with an examination of the methods and politics of performance measurement in anti-corruption agencies and the extent to which performance indicators aff ect institutional survival.
